An Indian Ocean dilemma: Sino-Indian rivalry and China's strategic vulnerability in the Indian Ocean by Brewster, David
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
An Indian Ocean dilemma: Sino-Indian rivalry and China’s 
strategic vulnerability in the Indian Ocean 
 
David Brewster * 
 
Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Level 3, Hedley Bull Centre, 
Building # 130, Garran Road, Canberra, ACT 0200, Australia 
 
This paper looks at the key strategic issues faced by China in the Indian Ocean within 
the context of growing Sino-Indian rivalry. It makes two basic arguments: first, that 
China has considerable strategic disadvantages in the Indian Ocean as compared with 
India; and second, that India has had more success than China in developing security 
relationships in the region. These propositions differ from a more common narrative, 
according to which China is establishing security relationships throughout the region 
that seriously threaten India. This paper argues that, on the contrary, China faces a 
strategic dilemma right across the Indian Ocean that it will only be able to partially 
mitigate in the short to medium term. Perhaps we should be asking how China’s 
strategic vulnerability should be best managed.  
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On 27 January 2014, a Chinese naval action group, including China’s largest amphibious 
landing ship, the Changbaishan, and two modern destroyers, Wuhan and Haikou, 
steamed south through the Sunda Strait into the Indian Ocean. The Chinese vessels 
conducted a brief series of exercises in international waters between the Indonesian 
island of Java and Australia’s Christmas Island, almost certainly within the Indonesian 
or Australian EEZs, and then returned to the Pacific via the Lombok Strait (Medcalf,  
2014). This unannounced exercise was the first of its kind by China’s PLA Navy in the 
eastern Indian Ocean, and was intended to demonstrate China’s capabilities against a 
sophist-icated naval adversary – as official Chinese media later suggested, it involved 
‘quick response training for electronic war in the Indian Ocean’ (CCTV.com,  2014).  
The Chinese exercise was followed only a few days later by a large multilateral 
naval exercise hosted by the Indian Navy in the neighbouring Bay of Bengal. India’s 
Exercise Milan 2014 involved vessels from 16 guest navies and coastguards from across 
the Indo-Pacific, including representatives from South Asia (Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and 
the Maldives); Southeast Asia (Myanmar, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, 
Cam-bodia and the Philippines); Australasia (Australia and New Zealand), and even a 
strong representation from the western Indian Ocean (Kenya, Mauritius, Seychelles and 
Tanzania). Exercise Milan is held biennially and is primarily an exercise in Indian 
maritime diplomacy, focusing on building relationships and confidence among the 
military maritime community of participating states. 
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This paper uses these two recent naval exercises as a starting point to consider the 
key strategic dilemma faced by China in the Indian Ocean within the context of growing 
Sino-Indian rivalry. The balance of power in the Indian Ocean is changing quickly, 
driven by the erosion of the longstanding US strategic predominance and the rise of 
China and India as major powers. However, at least at present, strategic competition in 
this region appears to be much more pronounced between China and India than between 
either of those countries and the United States. The US has been the predominant power 
in the Indian Ocean for decades and might well be seen as a more known quantity. 
Indeed, many analysts see a significant danger of an increasing strategic contest between 
China and India in the Indian Ocean as they jostle for influence and position in ways 
reminiscent of US–Soviet rivalry during the Cold War (Kaplan,  2009; Mohan,  2012).  
The paper makes two basic arguments: first, China faces major geostrategic 
disadvantages in the Indian Ocean as compared with India; and second, that compared 
with China, India has had considerable success in developing security relationships with 
the Indian Ocean states. Although China is seeking to develop strategic partners, few 
countries in the region would realistically see China as a security provider. These 
propositions differ from a more common narrative, under which a Chinese juggernaut is 
expanding its economic and political influence as a precursor to developing a security 
presence in the region that could threaten India. This paper argues that, on the contrary, 
China faces a strategic dilemma across much of the Indian Ocean that it will find 
difficult to resolve in the foreseeable future. Those concerned about the security 
dynamics of the region need to take this strategic vulnerability into account. 
 
 
China’s geostrategic vulnerability in the Indian Ocean  
China faces profound strategic challenges in the Indian Ocean region, which it cannot 
easily overcome, and this will likely have a significant effect on the strategic dynamic 
between China and India. China’s overwhelming strategic imperative in the Indian 
Ocean is the protection of its sea lines of communication (SLOCs) across the Indian 
Ocean, particularly the transport of energy. The most important of these SLOCs extends 
from the Strait of Hormuz at the mouth of the Persian Gulf, around the Indian 
subcontinent into the Bay of Bengal and through the Straits of Malacca. Other SLOCs 
extend across the Indian Ocean from Suez and from southern Africa. China is probably 
most vulnerable in the Malacca Strait, through which around 82% of China’s oil imports 
pass (US Department of Defense,  2012, p. 42). According to Chinese President Hu 
Jiantao this chokepoint represents China’s ‘Malacca Dilemma’ (Storey,  2006). China 
also faces the so-called ‘Hormuz Dilemma’ in the Persian Gulf, where some 40% of 
China’s oil imports transit the Strait of Hormuz. Indeed, as will be discussed in this 
paper, China faces a dilemma across the entire Indian Ocean, where its SLOCs are 
highly vulnerable to threats from state and non-state actors.  
China’s strategic vulnerability in the Indian Ocean is principally a function of 
geography. The Indian Ocean is a largely enclosed ocean, with few entry points and vast 
distances between. The east–west sea lanes across the ocean, over which much of the 
world’s energy is carried, are highly vulnerable to interdiction. This creates a strategic 
premium for those powers that are able to control the so-called ‘chokepoints’ and deny 
their rivals access to key ports. For more than 500 years, since the Portuguese adventurer 
and imperialist, Afonso de Albuquerque, transformed the Indian Ocean into a mare 
clausum (or ‘closed sea’) over which Portugal had exclusive jurisdiction, competing 
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powers have jostled over control of the Indian Ocean chokepoints and the ports in 
between. The Indian Navy’s  2007 Maritime Military Strategy expressly invokes 
Albuquerque’s name to justify India’s strategy of seeking control over the key entry and 
exit points to the Indian Ocean (Indian Navy,  2007, p. 59). In contrast, to India’s 
position, China currently has no ability to exert control over any of these chokepoints 
and nor has it any regular naval presence in any of the ports between.  
China’s strategic vulnerability is reinforced by the scarcity of overland transport 
connections between it and the Indian Ocean. Formidable geographic barriers created by 
the mountain ranges, deserts and jungles along the southern edge of the Eurasian 
continent make the development of such links very difficult. Indeed, until well into the 
twentieth century, there were no major transport routes – roads, railways or rivers – 
connecting China with the Indian Ocean. Even today, there are only a handful of tenuous 
north–south links across the southern Asian littoral. This disconnect has limited China’s 
presence and influence in the region and further narrows China’s strategic options. 
Virtually all of China’s trade with Europe and the Middle East must cross the Indian 
Ocean, from west to east it must skirt the Indian subcontinent and transit Southeast Asia 
before landing at China’s Pacific Ocean ports.  
A combination of these factors means that in strategic jargon the Indian Ocean 
represents ‘exterior lines’ for China and ‘interior lines’ for India. The great triangle of 
Indian subcontinent that juts south from Eurasia dominates the entire northern Indian 
Ocean, giving India a natural centrality to the region. Geography provides India with 
considerable military advantages in the Indian Ocean, including short lines of 
communication to its own bases and resources. China has corresponding disadvantages, 
including the need to deploy its naval forces to the Indian Ocean through narrow and 
dangerous chokepoints and then cope with very uncertain logistical support when it 
arrives (Holmes,  2012). As a result, unlike other dimensions of strategic competition 
between India and China, the Indian Ocean is one area where India holds a clear military 
advantage over China. While there may be debate about the ultimate utility of India’s 
ability to dominate Indian Ocean SLOCs, it is nevertheless still seen as a key bargaining 
chip. As the former Indian Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral Mehta, once commented, ‘The 
weak area for China today is the Indian Navy. We sit in the Indian Ocean and that is a 
concern for China and they are not happy as it is not so easy for them to come inside’ 
(Zeenews.com,  2009).  
Indeed, the rarity of the PLA Navy actually ‘coming inside’ the Indian Ocean is 
demonstrated by reactions to the foray of the Chinese surface action group into the Indian 
Ocean in January 2014. Some analysts breathlessly claimed that the voyage demonstrated the 
PLA Navy’s ability to ‘break through’ the first island chain – as if the Chinese vessels had 
broken some maritime blockade (Wroe,  2014). 1 But one could also see the voyage as 
unremarkable: the ability of three Chinese ships to travel several thousand kilometres through 
international waters in the twenty-first century, just as ships have been doing for hundreds or 
thousands of years, should not be seen as an achievement of particular note. Indeed, the 
Chinese exercise only served to emphasise that the PLA Navy can only deploy to the Indian 
Ocean through a handful of narrow straits through the Indonesian archipelago – Malacca, 
Sunda, Lombok or Weitar – where its naval vessels can be tracked with relative ease and are 
highly vulnerable to interdiction. 2  
China is trying to mitigate its vulnerabilities in the Indian Ocean in several ways: first, 
through building capabilities to project limited naval and air power into the Indian Ocean; 
second, through gaining greater access for its naval vessels to ports in the Indian Ocean; 
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and third, by developing limited overland transportation links to the Indian Ocean 
through Myanmar and potentially also Pakistan. But despite some of the rhetoric 
surrounding China’s growing presence in the Indian Ocean, these do little to mitigate 
China’s fundamental strategic disadvantages. 
 
China’s naval modernisation  
In recent years, China has embarked on a major naval expansion programme that has the 
potential to change the naval balance of power in the Western Pacific (US Congressional 
Research Service,  2014). China’s overall naval capabilities now exceed India’s in 
quantitative and qualitative terms and this differential is likely to expand in the coming 
years. But, significantly, China’s power projection capabilities in the Indian Ocean are 
limited and are likely to remain so in the foreseeable future (Yung,  2010). The PLA 
Navy has little experience in projecting power beyond coastal waters. Although it has 
made relatively small anti-piracy deployments in the Arabian Sea since 2008, these 
deploy-ments have not transformed the PLA Navy into a true blue water navy. Despite 
its naval expansion programme, it has a limited number of blue water naval combatants 
and limited long-range air strike capabilities. Even if it builds those capabilities, China’s 
ability to project power into the Indian Ocean will be highly constrained by the long 
distance from Chinese ports and air bases. The closest Chinese naval base to the Indian 
Ocean is at Hainan Island in the north of the South China Sea. Its air bases in southern 
China are at long distances from the Indian Ocean and the PLA Air Force has limited 
mid-air refuelling capabilities (Perrett,  2011). These constraints are compounded by the 
lack of guaranteed logistical support facilities available to the PLA Navy in the Indian 
Ocean, and the need for Chinese naval vessels to deploy to the Indian Ocean through the 
narrow chokepoints through the Indonesian archipelago. For these and other reasons, 
many analysts argue that for the foreseeable future, China’s core naval objective will be 
on sea-denial in the Western Pacific (Singh,  2013). 
 
 
China’s string of pearls  
Some believe that China is seeking to mitigate its lack of naval bases or logistic support 
facilities in the Indian Ocean through what has been called the ‘String of Pearls’ strategy 
in which the PLA Navy will develop bases or have access to facilities across the 
northern Indian Ocean. Over the last decade or so, Chinese companies have been 
involved in the funding and construction of commercial port facilities at Gwadar (in 
Pakistan) and Hambantota (in Sri Lanka) and Kyaukpyu (in Myanmar). It is sometimes 
claimed that China has negotiated secret rights to allow the PLAN to develop a 
permanent presence in these ports when needed.  
Since the term was coined in 2005, the String of Pearls narrative in its various forms 
has been a prominent factor in Indian public debate about China and its intentions in the 
Indian Ocean (Maitra,  2005; Ramachandran,  2007). But there are considerable doubts 
about whether these ‘Pearls’ would make good naval bases for China. According to 
some analysts, converting the ports of Gwadar and Hambantota into naval bases would 
require billions of dollars in investment in order to ensure their viability in wartime, and 
that their exposed position would make them difficult to defend, especially against an 
enemy equipped with long-range precision strike capability (Holmes & Yoshihara,  
2008; Kostecka,  2010). Nor would a permanent Chinese naval presence at these ports 
prevent 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Journal of the Indian Ocean Region 5 
 
the interdiction of Chinese energy supplies. Indeed to properly mitigate its vulnerabilities in 
the Indian Ocean, China would need to be able to defend the entire length of its SLOCs that 
run from inside the Persian Gulf around the Indian subcontinent and through the Malacca 
Straits. While any Chinese naval presence might have some defensive value, it would have 
limited offensive value for China, as any offensive actions would immediate expose China’s 
long and vulnerable SLOCs to retaliatory measures.  
Others argue that instead of trying to build naval bases, China will instead pursue a 
‘places not bases’ strategy. This term refers to the post-Cold War strategy of the United 
States of seeking to avoid the political and economic costs associated with the 
establishment of permanent US bases in other countries in favour of more flexible 
arrangements that guarantee the US military access to critical infrastructure in times of 
crisis. In some ways this may make considerable sense for China, especially in avoiding 
the high political costs that would likely be associated with establishing a permanent 
naval presence in the Indian Ocean. However, its practical value would be very much 
dependent on the quality and reliability of China’s security relationships in the region. 
Such a strategy would require China to enter into agreements with host countries that 
allow for PLA Navy vessels to obtain logistical support when required. Indeed, Chinese 
vessels regularly use the ports of Djibouti, Salalah (in Oman) and Port Victoria 
(Seychelles) for logistical support of their anti-piracy deployment in the Arabian Sea 
(Kostecka,  2010). But a ‘places not bases’ strategy would only by successful if it 
provided Beijing with a reasonable degree of certainty that facilities would be available 
to the PLA Navy in the event of an acute crisis or conflict. The question therefore 
becomes: what countries in the Indian Ocean region would be willing to host Chinese 
vessels in an acute crisis, including one that involved India or the United States?  
In contrast to these debates about China’s intentions, Beijing argues that the various 
port projects in the Indian Ocean region are purely commercial in nature. Indeed, 
although the PLA Navy has been deployed on anti-piracy duties in the Arabian Sea since 
2008, Beijing has been careful to minimise any overt military presence in the Indian 
Ocean and has flatly denied that it has any intention to establish any military bases in the 
region (The Hindu,  2012). Since late 2013, Beijing has also promoted its ‘Maritime Silk 
Route’ (MSR) initiative as an alternative narrative to the String of Pearls. Details remain 
sketchy, but the proposal appears to envisage a China-centric system of ports, 
infrastructure projects and special economic zones in Southeast Asia and the northern 
Indian Ocean. While much of public discussion to date has focused on ports and 
infrastructure, probably of greater significance is the development of new production 
and distribution chains across the region, with China at its centre. If implemented, the 
initiative would no doubt bind countries in the northern Indian Ocean much closer to the 
Chinese economy. The implications of the initiative for Indian Ocean security are not yet 
clear. 
 
 
The development of overland connections to the Indian Ocean  
China is also seeking to mitigate its strategic vulnerability in the Indian Ocean through 
developing new overland connections to the Indian Ocean through Myanmar and 
Pakistan. China has had most success in developing connections through Myanmar, 
including recently completed oil and gas pipelines between the new deep-water port of 
Kyaukpyu in Myanmar and China’s southern Yunnan province. The decision to build the 
oil pipeline, in particular, was heavily influenced by Beijing’s concerns over the 
Malacca 
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Dilemma, although when examined in detail, some of these arguments seem 
questionable (Kong,  2010). But the strategic value of Kyaukpyu port is also severely 
limited by the lack of road and rail links to China. The Kyaukpyu corridor was intended 
to include a 1200 km railway to the Chinese city of Kunming at a cost of US$20 billion. 
The Myanmar government has recently had second thoughts about the project, 
particularly over the strategic implications of Chinese control over the railway. There are 
also growing reservations in China about proceeding with such a major project in the 
‘China-unfriendly’ environment in Myanmar (Sun,  2014).  
China’s other grand Indian Ocean corridor project is the BCIM project, which would 
involve building a road and manufacturing corridor from Kunming to Calcutta, via Myanmar, 
India’s northeast states and Bangladesh, at a claimed cost of US$20 billion. China has also 
mooted plans to improve transport connectivity between its western Xinjian province and the 
Arabian Sea through Pakistan, through the development of a so-called China–Pakistan 
Economic Corridor between Gwadar and Kashgar in the western Chinese province of 
Xinjiang, at an expected cost of US$18 billion (Mohan,  2013). This would include improved 
road/rail links to Karachi and a proposed oil pipeline and road/ rail link to Gwadar. But these 
links would traverse regions of Pakistan where there are significant security risks, which 
makes it difficult to envisage that a dependable large-scale corridor could be established to 
Gwadar, at least in the current security environment.  
The trans-Myanmar and trans-Pakistan projects are part of Beijing’s ‘bridgehead 
strategy’ of turning Yunnan and Xinjiang provinces into gateways for economic 
engagement with the Indian Ocean. It is intended to develop a series of overland 
pathways to the Indian Ocean and using Yunnan as a ‘base’ facing South Asia and 
Southeast Asia to support export processing (Liu,  2013). Xinjiang province in western 
China will act as a bridgehead for connections with Central Asia and Pakistan. The 
projects, if completed, would likely have major economic and strategic implications for 
China’s role in the region. The new connections could stimulate considerable economic 
development in the land-locked provinces of Xinjiang, Tibet and Yunnan, and would 
also likely lead to an expansion of China’s economic and political influence in their host 
states, Pakistan and Myanmar, and other neighbouring states. As a result, some of 
China’s partners are nervous about the strategic implications. Myanmar has blocked 
some proposals due to concerns about their implications for China’s influence in the 
country. Some in Delhi fear that these new connections will challenge India’s interests in 
the region and that the BCIM proposal could even threaten India’s national cohesion by 
integrating India’s estranged northeastern states into the Chinese economy.  
However, the extent to which these new connections may ultimately mitigate 
China’s strategic vulnerability in the Indian Ocean can be overstated. The Kyaukpyu–
Kunming oil pipeline, for example, may only account for some 6.7% of China’s total oil 
imports in 2015 and 3.4% by 2030 (Erickson & Collins,  2010, pp. 91–92). China’s 
ability to rely on the Kyaukpyu and Gwadar pipelines as an alternative to shipping oil 
through the Malacca Strait would be moot if Chinese tankers were intercepted in, say, 
the Persian Gulf or the Arabian Sea and the pipelines themselves would be highly 
vulnerable to being cut by precision strikes or attack by local insurgents.  
An unintended consequence of these linkages, if fully developed, may be to give 
Beijing a much greater stake in the internal security of Pakistan and Myanmar, perhaps 
not necessarily to China’s benefit. Beijing has historically been able to maintain good 
relations with Pakistan and Myanmar while avoiding becoming involved in their dire 
internal security problems, but this may become difficult to sustain. China has already 
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had to deploy security forces in Pakistan‐administered Kashmir near the Chinese border 
to provide security for its construction and maintenance workers from attacks by Islamic 
and tribal groups (Harrison,  2010). 3 China could easily find itself called upon to secure 
a much larger corridor extending across much of the length of Pakistan. Similarly, China 
could also find itself with a stake in Myanmar’s intractable domestic insurgencies in the 
event that major investments are threatened. The prospect of deployments of Chinese 
forces to protect Chinese interests would have considerable implications for the region.  
But the most immediate effect of these projects will likely be economic. The 
establishment of development corridors across Myanmar and Pakistan would have major 
implications for Chinese interests through the entire country. Pakistan’s leaders are 
apparently enthusiastic about it, while Myanmar has been more circumspect about the 
growth in Chinese influence. Popular reactions against Chinese developments elsewhere 
in Myanmar indicate that there are significant risks for China. 
 
 
A contest for influence  
This author has previously argued that, contrary to some of the rhetoric, no security 
dilemma exists between India and China in respect of the naval balance in the Indian 
Ocean within the meaning of international relations theory (Brewster,  2014b). A 
‘security dilemma’, as posited by theorists such as Robert Jervis (Jervis,  1978), would 
require each of India and China to be realistically concerned that the other is taking 
actions that may give a strategic advantage over it so as to create a threat (and not, for 
example, merely seeking to mitigate an existing strategic disadvantage). As noted above, 
there is little evidence that China could realistically gain a strategic advantage over India 
in the Indian Ocean in the foreseeable future, at least in the maritime realm. But while 
the concept of a ‘security dilemma’ may not be entirely useful in understanding the 
dynamics of competition between India and China in the Indian Ocean, it does not mean 
that there is not a very keen contest for influence between India and China in the Indian 
Ocean: for India to maintain its considerable geostrategic advantage, and for China to 
partially mitigate its disadvantage. This is currently being played out in a jostle for 
influence between India and China throughout the region.  
As discussed above, the PLA Navy exercise in January 2014 highlighted not only 
China’s geographic isolation from the Indian Ocean but also the shallowness of its 
security relationships. Although China’s relationships in the region are undoubtedly 
growing, there are few countries in the Indian Ocean region that would realistically 
consider China as a key security provider. Indeed, the contrast between the Milan naval 
exercise conducted by India in February 2014 and the unnamed Chinese naval exercise 
conducted a few days earlier could not have been greater in terms of regional 
relationships. The Chinese deployment was unilateral and the PLA Navy vessels 
received no support from any neighbouring states. In contrast, India’s Milan exercise 
involved vessels from 16 guest navies and coastguards from across the Indo-Pacific. The 
exercise series is not primarily intended for practising technical skills, but rather is 
focused on building confidence and relationships among the military maritime 
community of participating states. The exercise is an expression of India’s success in 
demonstrating strategic leadership as it grows as a credible power.  
The symbolism of Milan was reinforced a few weeks later with the announcement by 
India’s National Security Advisor, Shiv Shankar Menon, that the Indian Ocean island 
states of Seychelles and Mauritius would be joining India’s existing naval arrangement 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8 D. Brewster 
 
with Sri Lanka and the Maldives in a new Indian Ocean security grouping that some 
have called the ‘IO-5’ (The Hindu,  2014). India has held joint naval exercises with Sri 
Lanka for some years and these have been expanded to trilateral exercises with the 
Maldives Coast Guard. The proposed IO-5 arrangement has not yet been implemented, 
and it is not clear whether it would go much beyond meetings of respective national 
security advisors to include operational cooperation. 4 But such an arrangement, if 
implemented, would represent an important development in regional security 
architecture and would represent the first time that India has explicitly taken a security 
leadership role in the Indian Ocean beyond South Asia. Importantly, in announcing this 
arrangement, Menon also fore-shadowed that in future similar arrangements may be 
replicated with Bay of Bengal states.  
These developments can be seen as a manifestation of the 2013 announcement by 
Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh that henceforth India should be seen as a ‘net 
security provider to the region’ (The Hindu,  2013). But while there appears to be a 
growing recognition and acceptance of India’s role as a regional security provider, its 
role in different parts of the Indian Ocean region is uneven. In October 2014, Delhi 
commenced an unusual whole-of-government review of its Indian Ocean strategy in an 
attempt to develop a coordinated approach to defence and commercial relationships in 
the region (Taneja,  2014). India’s has long had close security relationships with the 
Indian Ocean island states. In the eastern Indian Ocean, India has had growing security 
relationships with ASEAN countries and Australia for some years (Brewster,  2013) and 
the Bay of Bengal has now become a particular area of focus (Taneja,  2014). In the 
western Indian Ocean, India also has growing security relationships with some smaller 
Arab states (such as Oman and UAE), but its overall security role in the Persian Gulf 
remains somewhat constrained (Brewster,  2014a). Overall, the United States remains 
the most important security partner for most states in the Indian Ocean region and is 
likely to remain so for some time to come, although Washington is generally happy to 
see India further develop its role as a regional security provider.  
China’s economic influence is also growing throughout the Indian Ocean region, in 
line with its rise as a world economic power. China is now the biggest trading partner for 
many states in the Indian Ocean region and is a major source of investment, especially in 
infrastructure. Several countries also seek to use China as a partial balance or hedge in 
their political and economic relations with bigger powers such as the United States and 
India (Kaplan,  2009; Mohan,  2012). While many, if not all, states in the region are 
eager for more Chinese trade and investment, with some exceptions there is as yet little 
indication that these economic relations are being translated into substantive security or 
defence relationships, particularly in the maritime realm. Smaller states, including Indian 
Ocean islands such as Sri Lanka, Maldives and Seychelles from time to time seek to play 
the ‘China card’ in an effort to extract more concessions or economic assistance from 
India. For some, such as Myanmar, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, China is also a major 
source of arms. This is driven by several factors including the relative price of Chinese 
defence technology (a very important factor for most Indian Ocean states), the existence 
of international arms embargos (which at times have affected Myanmar and Sri Lanka) 
and balancing considerations (which at times have been important considerations for 
states such as Myanmar and Bangladesh).  
But concerns that arms supply relationships will be translated into substantive defence 
relationships are yet to be proved. Until recently, there were widespread concerns that the 
apparently close economic, political and arms supply relationship between China and the 
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Myanmar military regime would be translated into a de facto alliance. Through the 
1990s, Chinese companies were involved in the development or upgrading of several 
ports in Myanmar and the construction of a signals intelligence facility in the Bay of 
Bengal, which many analysts claimed were part of China’s String of Pearls strategy 
(Malik,  2011). But while Myanmar was happy to accept Chinese arms and investment it 
apparently had no intention of strategically subordinating itself to Beijing (Myint-U,  
2011). Indeed, the Indian Navy publicly conceded in 2005 that there were no Chinese 
naval bases anywhere in Myanmar (Asian Defence Journal,  2005). Beginning in 2011, 
Myanmar has partly distanced itself from China. The cancellation of the huge Myitsone 
dam project, which had been sponsored by China and was intended to be a major source 
of electricity to southern China, ‘fundamentally shook Chinese leaders’ trust and 
confidence in Myanmar as a partner’ (Sun,  2012). This was followed soon after by 
Myanmar’s political opening towards the United States and India and the partial 
liberalisation of its political system, all of which has substantially reduced China’s 
influence in the country. These developments may have been the result of an 
overestimation by China of its political and economic influence. In any event, the 
deterioration of its relationship with Myanmar probably represents a significant set-back 
for China in the Indian Ocean region.  
Similarly, despite concerns about China’s role as the major supplier of weapons and 
training to the Bangladesh armed forces (see, for example, Sitaraman,  2013), there are 
no reliable indicators that this has been translated into a substantive defence relationship. 
There is no operational coordination between the Bangladeshi and Chinese armed forces, 
they hold no substantive bilateral military exercises and nor is there any indication that 
Bangladesh would be willing to host any Chinese naval or other military presence 
(Kabir,  2014; Samaranayake,  2012). The recent cancellation by Bangladesh of an order 
for two Chinese Ming class submarines and their replacement with an order for Russian 
submarines is a clear indication that Bangladesh will shop around for the best deal in 
equipment (Gupta,  2014). Dhaka has also made it clear that its preference is to have to 
new deep-water ports at Sonadia or elsewhere developed by a consortium of 
international investors not dominated by China.  
But China’s influence is growing elsewhere. Pakistan is China’s principal partner 
and de facto ally in the region, and the relationship is growing closer. Since the 1960s, 
China has established itself as a major supplier of arms to Pakistan and provided it with 
significant strategic support against India. The so-called ‘all weather friendship’ with 
Pakistan (alongside its relationship with North Korea) is the closest China has come to a 
long-term alliance. The China factor has played a significant role in limiting India’s 
strategic options with Pakistan, largely through perceived threats on the Sino-Indian 
border in the Himalayas and through facilitating the proliferation of nuclear weapons 
and missiles to Pakistan. As noted above, in recent years, Pakistan has indicated its 
readiness to host Chinese naval facilities at the port of Gwadar, although Beijing has 
responded cautiously to these suggestions. China may have good reasons to be cautious 
about the parameters of its relationship with Pakistan. While the United States is able to 
maintain freedom of navigation in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, China may 
as yet have little reason to establish a military presence at Gwadar.  
Sri Lanka could also become an important strategic partner. Since at least 2009, Colombo 
has been keen to cultivate Beijing as an economic partner to drive development and as a 
diplomatic partner to help fend off international pressure over human rights issues. Sri Lanka 
has now cast itself as China’s primary partner in the MSR initiative. 
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Under the Rajapaksa Government there were indications of Sri Lanka’s willingness to 
give China access to military-related facilities. In October 2014, apparently as part of the 
MSR initiative, it was revealed that China has been invited to take over management of a 
new and enlarged Phase II development of Hambantota port, which will include berths 
dedicated for Chinese use. The previous government also proposed to establish a 
Chinese-run facility in northern Sri Lanka to support the Sri Lankan Air Force. Concerns 
about a possible Chinese military presence in Sri Lanka were also heightened by visits in 
September and October 2014 of Chinese submarines to a new Chinese-built port in 
Colombo (Brewster,  2014c). But these developments may be reversed following the 
election of President Sirisena in January 2015 on a platform of placing the relationship 
with China on a more ‘balanced’ footing. While Sri Lanka may find a partnership with 
China as providing useful economic and political benefits, it is difficult to envisage it 
changing India’s geostrategic domination of that island. 
 
 
Conclusion  
China suffers from fundamental strategic vulnerability in the Indian Ocean and its ability to 
mitigate that vulnerability is limited. For the foreseeable future, China is likely to have only a 
very limited ability to project power into the Indian Ocean. The development of China’s 
putative ‘Pearls’ and tenuous overland transport links would do little to mitigate these 
vulnerabilities. Indeed, it is difficult to conceive how China could ultimately unable to protect 
the entirety of its Indian Ocean SLOCs from India in the event of conflict between the two. 
Although India’s overall military capabilities are considerably less than China’s, the 
geographic centrality of the Indian subcontinent, which sits astride the key sea lanes that 
cross the northern Indian Ocean, give it considerable natural advantages. 
China’s strategic disadvantages in the Indian Ocean are only further reinforced by 
the strategic alignments of the Indian Ocean states, which largely tend towards the 
United States and/or India. After decades of avoiding security alignments in the Indian 
Ocean region, partly on ideological grounds, India is now in the process of building 
regional alignments in which it takes a leadership role.  
China’s economic influence in the region is undoubtedly growing. While this carries 
with it a degree of political influence, it would be a mistake to assume that this 
necessarily automatically translates into the security realm. While there is considerable 
jostling among China, India and the United States to develop influence in the Indian 
Ocean region, no Indian Ocean state (with the exception of Pakistan) would currently be 
entitled to seriously consider China as a major security provider. Most states are more or 
less following the experiences of other Asian states in developing their economic 
relationships with China while hedging their bets in terms of security. No doubt China’s 
strategic role will continue to develop in the Indian Ocean, but it is as yet difficult to 
envisage China overcoming its geostrategic vulnerabilities in the region. Those 
concerned about the security dynamics of the Indian Ocean region need to take into 
account the fundamental vulnerability faced by China. 
 
 
Disclosure statement  
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Journal of the Indian Ocean Region 11 
 
Notes  
1. See, also to similar effect, Chinese media reports quoted in US-China Economic and Security 
Review Commission Staff Report,  2014. The First and Second Island Chains are notional strings   
of islands running from Japan through the western Pacific and Southeast Asia that could be 
used to ‘cut off’ China’s access to the ocean. Indonesia actually sits in the notional Second 
Island Chain.   
2. By sea and air and potentially also by land-based anti-ship cruise missiles deployed at the 
choke points.   
3. Chinese troops likely numbered in the hundreds and not the thousands as reported in the New 
York Times.   
4. The implementation of the IO-5 arrangement has been slowed by Colombo, apparently because 
of political irritations with Mauritius. Confidential interview by author with a senior Sri Lankan 
government official, October 2014. Colombo’s position may well change following the election 
of a new president in January 2015.  
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